29 ideas
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |