Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and the Past', 'works' and 'Epistemology: contemporary introduction'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

38 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
8195 Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
8194 Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
8190 Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
8198 A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
8192 I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
2730 Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
2715 Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
2735 Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2721 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
8199 The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
2722 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
2728 The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
2727 Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
2717 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
2716 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2719 Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
2720 Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2718 Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2729 Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
2741 The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2725 To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
2724 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
2731 Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
2739 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2738 Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
2740 A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2737 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
2726 We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
8193 Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
8189 Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
8191 The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
8197 Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
8196 The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]