34 ideas
| 13939 | No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap] |
| 8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
| 8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
| 8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
| 13936 | Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap] |
| 8748 | Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro] |
| 8960 | Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó] |
| 13933 | Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap] |
| 8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
| 13934 | To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap] |
| 8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
| 8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
| 8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
| 8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
| 13938 | A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap] |
| 13935 | We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap] |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| 13932 | Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap] |
| 13937 | New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap] |
| 8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
| 13940 | All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap] |
| 8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
| 8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
| 8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
| 8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
| 8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
| 8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
| 8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
| 8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
| 8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
| 8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
| 8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
| 8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |