62 ideas
| 3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
| 11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
| 11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
| 11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
| 11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
| 11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
| 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
| 11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
| 11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
| 11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
| 11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
| 5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
| 5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
| 16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
| 5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
| 16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
| 11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
| 11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
| 11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
| 11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
| 3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
| 5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
| 5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
| 11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
| 11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
| 11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
| 5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
| 11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
| 5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
| 11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
| 5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
| 5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
| 5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
| 5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
| 11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
| 11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
| 11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
| 11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
| 11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
| 11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
| 5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
| 11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
| 5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
| 15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
| 12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
| 16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |