Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and the Past', 'Sense Data and the Percept Theory' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

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28 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]