Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and the Past', 'Causation and Explanation' and 'Authority and the Individual'

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61 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell]
Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell]
In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell]
In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell]
Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell]
Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]