43 ideas
| 21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
| 21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
| 21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
| 21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
| 21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
| 21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
| 21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
| 21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
| 21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
| 21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
| 21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
| 21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
| 5060 | All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz] |
| 21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
| 21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
| 21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
| 21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
| 21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
| 21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
| 21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
| 21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
| 21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
| 21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
| 21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
| 5059 | Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |