26 ideas
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |