37 ideas
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
| 15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
| 15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
| 15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
| 15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |