34 ideas
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 18529 | Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 16779 | Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham] |
| 16757 | Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 9102 | If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
| 19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
| 9115 | To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham] |