17 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |