26 ideas
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |