40 ideas
| 17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
| 17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
| 17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
| 7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
| 7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
| 7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
| 7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
| 17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
| 17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
| 17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
| 7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
| 17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
| 17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
| 7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
| 7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
| 7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
| 7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
| 7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
| 7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
| 7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
| 7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
| 7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| 7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
| 7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
| 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
| 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
| 17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
| 17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
| 17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
| 7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
| 7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
| 7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |
| 17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |