Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysics: contemporary introduction', 'Philosophy of Logic' and 'fragments/reports'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


27 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
'⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux]
Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius]