Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'On 'Physics'' and 'Knowledge First (and reply)'

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28 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
16664 Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16703 God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
16699 Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19527 We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
19528 Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
19529 Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
19530 A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
19531 Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
19536 Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
19526 Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19534 How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
19533 Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
19532 Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]