98 ideas
6779 | Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
6780 | Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
6796 | Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird] |
6797 | Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
6800 | Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird] |
6786 | As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird] |
6792 | If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird] |
6757 | Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird] |
6777 | Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird] |
6804 | There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird] |
6805 | Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird] |
6778 | Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird] |
6775 | Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird] |
6791 | If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird] |
6790 | Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird] |
6738 | Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird] |
6739 | Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird] |
6799 | We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird] |
6798 | Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird] |
6752 | The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird] |
6754 | We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird] |
6750 | Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird] |
6761 | Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird] |
6758 | 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird] |
6759 | Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird] |
6756 | Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird] |
6760 | An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird] |
6785 | Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird] |
6788 | Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird] |
6787 | Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird] |
6751 | Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird] |
23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |
6776 | Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird] |
6767 | Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird] |
6768 | Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird] |
6770 | Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird] |
6771 | Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird] |
6773 | If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird] |
6769 | In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird] |
6774 | Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird] |
6764 | Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird] |
6766 | Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird] |
6808 | Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird] |
6753 | Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird] |
6762 | Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird] |
6763 | Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird] |
6772 | Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird] |
6740 | 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird] |
6741 | There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird] |
6742 | A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird] |
6743 | If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird] |
6744 | Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird] |
6747 | Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird] |
6746 | There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird] |
6748 | Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird] |
6749 | We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird] |
6803 | If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird] |
6801 | Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird] |
6745 | A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird] |
6802 | With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird] |
6789 | If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird] |
6807 | In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird] |