30 ideas
22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |