22 ideas
| 18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
| 19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
| 19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
| 19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
| 19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
| 11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
| 19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
| 19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
| 11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
| 11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
| 11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
| 11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
| 11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| 11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
| 7634 | Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund] |