Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Possibility', 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value' and 'Justice: What's the right thing to do?'

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54 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel]
Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien]
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien]
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien]
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel]
Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel]
Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel]
A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel]
Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel]
Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel]
Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel]
Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel]
Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel]