52 ideas
| 17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
| 13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
| 13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
| 13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
| 13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
| 13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
| 13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
| 17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
| 17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
| 13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
| 13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
| 13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
| 13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
| 13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
| 13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
| 13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
| 13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
| 13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
| 13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
| 13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
| 13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
| 13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
| 13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
| 13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
| 13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
| 13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
| 13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
| 13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
| 17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
| 13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
| 13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
| 17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
| 13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
| 17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
| 17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
| 13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
| 17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
| 17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |