Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'Human, All Too Human' and 'Dispositions'

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110 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche]
Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche]
Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche]
Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche]
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche]
The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche]
Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche]
Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche]