20 ideas
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
20329 | A work of art is an artifact created for the artworld [Dickie] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |