20 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
18435 | Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |