20 ideas
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |