Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'The Histories' and 'A Study of Concepts'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


28 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]