56 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
12430 | Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher] |
12431 | I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher] |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
12428 | Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher] |
12429 | Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher] |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |