Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes' and 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
15785 Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15786 Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12719 Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
12720 Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]