Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Possibility', 'Making Things Happen' and 'Essence and Modality'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien]
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien]
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien]
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]