37 ideas
13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
21244 | Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm] |
21241 | Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm] |
21242 | If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm] |
1421 | A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm] |
21245 | The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm] |
21246 | Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm] |
21247 | Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm] |
21243 | An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm] |
1420 | Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm] |