Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'Aristotle on Essence and Explanation' and 'Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD)'

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13412 Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
13413 We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
13411 If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
13415 An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11993 Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
11997 A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11992 Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11995 Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung]
11996 Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung]