28 ideas
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
| 11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
| 11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
| 11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| 11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |