Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence' and 'Rationality'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6950 You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
6954 A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6955 Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
6952 Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
6953 All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
6951 Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]