38 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |