Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'On 'The Beginning of Philosophy'' and 'Theory of Good and Evil'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
19456 Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
1457 Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
6674 All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
6673 Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
1458 Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
1459 Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]