35 ideas
| 2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
| 2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
| 11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
| 11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
| 11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
| 11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| 11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
| 2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
| 2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
| 2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |