37 ideas
| 4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
| 8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
| 8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
| 8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| 8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| 8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
| 8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
| 8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
| 8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
| 11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| 11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
| 15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
| 11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
| 11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
| 11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| 11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
| 8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
| 4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
| 8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
| 8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |