23 ideas
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |