Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'The Dappled World' and 'Kinds of Minds'

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27 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
17503 Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
4608 Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4880 Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
4873 What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
4881 Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
4875 We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
4879 There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4876 Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4878 The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
4874 The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4882 Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4872 Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
4877 Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]