Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics' and 'works'

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24 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
10153 In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19141 Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16186 The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen]
16187 The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen]
16190 BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10048 There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10694 Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
10479 Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10157 Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16188 Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]