Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'Introducing Persons' and 'Moral Arguments'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]