30 ideas
8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |