61 ideas
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |