30 ideas
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |