28 ideas
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |