Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'Knowledge and its Limits' and 'Mathematical logic and theory of types'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
11064 Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
6407 The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10418 Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell]
10047 Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave]
23478 Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
21718 Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
18126 A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock]
18128 Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock]
18124 Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
4760 Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19512 Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose]