Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'The Intentional Fallacy' and 'Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]