74 ideas
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |