37 ideas
| 9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
| 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
| 11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
| 17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
| 9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
| 9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
| 9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
| 9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
| 9577 | The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
| 9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
| 11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
| 11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
| 11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
| 11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
| 11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| 11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
| 9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
| 9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
| 9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
| 9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
| 9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
| 9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
| 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
| 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
| 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
| 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
| 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
| 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
| 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |