24 ideas
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
8628 | I hold that algebra and number are developments of logic [Jevons] |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |