17 ideas
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
4054 | I may exist before I become a person, just as I exist before I become an adult [Lockwood] |
4055 | It isn't obviously wicked to destroy a potential human being (e.g. an ununited egg and sperm) [Lockwood] |
4056 | If the soul is held to leave the body at brain-death, it should arrive at the time of brain-creation [Lockwood] |